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Closing the gap: the link between social capital and microfinance services 
 
 
Rodolfo De la Torre and Patricia Lopez-Rodriguez  
Abstract 
 
The social capital has strengthened the solidarity funds when the legal 
mechanisms and institutions for monitoring and assistance would not have been 
present. The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of social capital on productivity 
and performance of the Mexican solidarity funds. For this it is obtained an estimator 
indirectly associated with inequality, through which it follows that if the social capital 
rises 1% the loans number increases by 0.2877% and the savings number increases by 
0.4598%, and for each additional producer that activate his social capital with his 
partners they will be generated increases in loans recoveries amounting to 597.41 
pesos. In this sense, a greater investment in social capital will recover a larger 
amount of borrowed funds and will increase savings and loans to poor producers. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Access to formal financial services by the poor is inaccessible or difficult considering that the 
poor do not have guarantees or collateral. The credit risk they entail and the resulting high 
interest rates they have to pay contribute to exclude them from the formal markets. 
Microfinance schemes that operate with social capital provide substitutes in terms of the 
social collateral and low-cost alternatives for lenders. Social capital is known as a set of 
individuals’ characteristics that allow them to trust each other, cooperate and form networks 
useful for solving economic problems. 
 
The social capital in microfinance facilitates access to credit and improves the performance of 
its financial operations. This allows microfinance schemes to achieve financial sustainability 
by raising their recoveries and reducing transaction costs and monitoring. The social capital in 
microfinance operates through information flows and better members’ selection, thus 
diminishing frauds and the risk of bankruptcy. 
 
The central objective of this paper is to analize the efect of the social capital in the 
performance of the solidarity funds, on the understanding that greater social capital improves 
access to financial services to promote microfinance schemes. This could be relevant 
considering that there is little access to financial services in Mexico, especially within the 
poor. This analyses if social capital is productive and affect positively the solidarity funds 
performance.  
 
Since it is not possible to directly measure the social capital it is associated with an indicator 
that relates inversely the social capital with inequality. In order to relate social capital with 
microfinances indicators an extrapolate method is used to get social capital indicators at 
municipal level through income inequality index. For this purpose the following hypothesis 
are explored: a) social capital can be estimated through an inequality index; b) The social 
capital affects the productivity, and c) social capital affects the financial performance of the 
solidarity funds. 
 
To test the first hypothesis it is estimated the social capital through an inequality index. The 
estimations are made with two methods and four indexes: Robin Hood, Variation Coefficient, 
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Gini and Relative Deprivation. The first method is based on a theoretical model that defines 
its nonlinear functional form. The social capital indicator consists of the resources offered by 
a person and it relates theoretically with a coefficient of sympathy which represents the 
degree to which a person joins the welfare of another in its utility function and that leads to 
share resources with other. The second method is the estimation of a linear equation that 
incorporates both a trust indicator from the World Values Survey and each of the four 
inequality indexes. From the statistical results it is inferred that the best social capital 
estimator is the coefficient of variation. 
 
To test the second and third hypothesis financial indicators from the solidarity funds and the 
estimator of social capital obtained are considered. Two equations are estimated to show the 
effect of the social capital in the solidarity funds products (savings and loans). Productivity is 
estimated by the degree of dependence of the loans on fund lending and social capital and 
dependence of the savings on the assets and social capital. To test performance it is proposed 
an equation that measures the dependence of the borrowed funds recoveries on loans average 
and social capital. The equations are represented by Cobb Douglas production functions and 
the social capital is incorporated as an indirect factor associated with the job. 
 
From the first equation estimation it is inferred that the number of loans depends positively on 
lending funds and social capital. In this way it is obtained that the higher social capital and the 
higher amount of resources available in the Solidarity funds the greater the number of loans to 
be granted. From the second equation estimation it is inferred that the number of savings 
transactions depends positively on assets and social capital. Thus, the provision of greater 
resources through the expansion of assets generates greater savings; and higher social capital 
will produce greater trust to deposit resources in the solidarity funds. 
 
From the third equation estimation it is inferred that recoveries of the borrowed funds are 
dependent on average loans and social capital. Then it is obtained that social capital affects 
positively the performance of the Solidarity funds via recoveries and these recoveries present 
a diverse behaviour when the average loans increase. Therefore, it is inferred that social 
capital has an effect on productivity and financial performance of the Solidarity funds. 
 
The main outcome of this paper is that an increase of 1% on members’ social capital increase 
loans in 0.29% and increase savings transactions in 0.46%, while each additional unit of 
social capital retrieve loans in 597 pesos, which otherwise would not be paid. In the process 
of achieving these results, it is confirmed that greater inequality in income distribution is 
associated with a lower trust among solidarity funds members, that is, with less social capital. 
 
The structure of this articule is made in 10 sections. In the second section explains the 
definition of social capital and its different meanings, the definition to be usedand the 
methodologies for its measurement. In the following section are described some reasons for 
the restricted access to the financial system of the poor. In section four describe the operation 
of the solidarity funds and its relationship with social capital. In section five there are 
described indicators of the financial solidarity funds. In the section six it is described the 
methodology and data sources for estimating the social capital. The section eight develops a 
theoretical model that underlies the functional form and basis for estimating the relationship 
between capital capital and inequality. In section nine some estimators are obtained and the 
working hypotheses are developed in adition to the estimated econometric equations. Finally 
section10 concludes. 
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2. Definition and mesurement of social capital  
 
The social capital concept is relatively recent, developed by Pierre Bourdieu in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, as such may be placed in the first half of the 20th century and its applications in 
the past 20 years. In the past, the concept was part of the skills, experience and knowledge 
that people used in isolation to transform into a productive process and human relations were 
found exclusively in the social structure. As Coleman (1988) stablished the relationships, 
when people try to make better use of their resources, are not only components of the social 
structure but resource for people. 
 
Social capital refers to networks, norms and trust that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Putnam, 1993). Social capital fosters reciprocity norms, allows the coordination and 
communication by creating channels through which information can flow from individuals, 
tested and verified. Contributes to solving problems of collective action and reduce the 
incentives for opportunism. 
 
The social capital concept is based on trust what distinguishes it from legal and political 
bodies and civil society. Including customs and forms of association that are spontaneous and 
not necessarily dependent on laws. Through the trust promotes cooperation and contributes to 
the achievement of agreements that involve risks in making decisions. Trust allows reducing 
costs associated with the formation and negotiation of agreements. 
 
In the literature there are two sides to discuss the concept; the first is linked to the way in 
which resources are obtained. The information, ideas and support that people can obtain 
through the relationship with other persons are considered as capital. Another type of capital 
is obtained in different ways such as physical or human which are essentially property of the 
people and not depend on others. The second concerns the nature and extent to which people 
engage in various informal networks and formal civic organizations. The term here is used to 
characterize the different ways in which individuals interact. 
 
The concept also has three ways to interface to access resources. The first relates to the 
“bonding” social capital –show the bonds of people on the basis of their sociodemographic 
characteristics such as those that occur between family members, neighbors, close friends and 
coworkers. The second relates to “bridging” social capital –are the bonds between people that 
relate mainly in groups with similar characteristics. The third relates to “linking” social 
capital –show the ties that a person uses with a position of authority to get resources, as a 
public representative (police, political party leaders) and institutions (banks, security 
agencies) (Gittell and Vidal 1998, Narayan 2002, Putnam 2000, Woolcock 1999). 
 
The “bridging” social capital is perceived as horizontal, while “linking” social capital is more 
vertical, connecting people to resources and key economic institutions. In the case of 
“linking” social capital is not the presence of the institutions which is an asset but the nature 
and extent of social bonds between customers and suppliers, many of which are inherently a 
way to get resources and/or services. 
 
Not always these three forms of social capital are used with positive effects they can be used 
for harmful purposes; for example, some exclusion rules are made to deny access to people to 
a service. The “linking” social capital can also be despotic or a mechanism for political 
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favoritism. Then not always the different dimensions of social capital provide useful results 
for the generation of goods and services. 
 
From the scope, social capital definition also distinguishes two types (cognitive and 
structural) and two dimensions (macro and micro) (Grootaert et al 2002). The breadth of the 
concept has been seen as a sign of strength and weakness. The weakness lies in being a 
multidimensional concept, it could be too broad to provide specific conclusions about 
individual behavior or more complex structures. The strength lies in the complementarity and 
substitution levels.  
 
The definition of social capital considered here is the following: “The sympathy that a person 
has towards another that causes that one offers social capital. People who offer social capital 
generate benefits, advantages and preferential treatment to others” (Robison and Siles, 1997). 
There are three reasons for adopting the above definition; on the one hand it takes into 
account the positive aspect of the concept. Secondly, it considers a micro level approach: a set 
of individual preferences that incorporates the well-being of others in the own welfare. 
Thirdly, it distinguishes what social capital is from what it makes and where it resides 
(Robison, Siles and Schmid, 2004).  
 
The lack of an agreed definition of social capital, combined with multidisciplinary approaches 
generated different interpretations and ways of estimating the concept. How to measure social 
capital? Depends on how it is defined. Depending on the definition, some indicators may be 
more appropriate than others. 
 
Because definitions of social capital are multidimensional, incorporating different levels and 
units of analysis, such as organizations, and community networks, this makes it difficult to 
obtain a single measure of social capital. As a result, there are created indexes that 
approximate estimates of social capital. However, there is a risk to generate these measures 
could end up capturing different dimensions to the original concept. 
 
One way to find a balance between these measures is to decompose the concept into its 
different dimensions and thus generate new comparable data sets. Some of the dimensions of 
social capital relate to the size (the number of people with social capital), geographical 
dispersion, density/integration, composition and homogeneity of members, frequency of 
contact between members, strength of ties (degree of intimacy, reciprocity, expectations of 
durability and availability), social participation and social anchorage (years of residence, 
neighborhood and community participation). There is also a risk in using these dimensions, it 
is to mix the determinants with the results, and sometimes its determinants could be even their 
results (eg. health and cultural diversity). 
 
In the literature (Grootaert, C., y van Bastelaer Th., 2002), the indicators generally used to 
measure social capital are trust in people or governments, culture, sympathy, affinity, 
solidarity, friendship, membership in civic organizations, time to maintain public services and 
conflict resolution, collaboration or cooperation with others, social mobility, social 
participation, social skills, building networks, shared norms, sense of obligation toward others 
and volunteering, among others. 
 
However, indicators that measure participation and membership to groups vaguely capture the 
social capital by counting only the percentage of the population that belong to an 
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organization. Participation in an organization can have different degrees, for example active 
membership is different than simple membership and within the active membership will be in 
a different way the degree of participation in terms number of personal contacts and time 
spent on solving common problems. 
 
Additionally, membership in an organization can reflect past investments in social capital and 
not the current state of the capital, contacts in an organization may differ depending on time in 
the organization or its investment in real capital. Thus, the membership may reflect a high 
level of social capital or a high depreciation. Also belonging to an organization not imply 
affinity or increased participation and being a member of more than one organization does not 
necessarily have more value in terms of social capital than a greater involvement in one 
organization. Moreover, if a person belongs to an organization tends to generate positive 
externalities while individual status tends to generate negative externalities, especially when it 
is a zero-sum game. 
 
In relation to the confidence or trust indicators they can generate aggregated social capital but 
not necessarily are good measures of individual social capital, for example if people trust in 
another it does not necessarily imply reciprocity, then if people does not have a repayment for 
his trust so to be more trusted will not be ndividually more productive. 
 
Usually social capital indicators are obtained from surveys, for example, some indicators like 
trust and civic cooperation are obtained from the World Values Survey (Knack and Keefer, 
1997). Others like newspaper readers, membership in associations like football and coral 
clubs and confidence in public institutions come from the General Social Survey (Putnam, 
1995). Teachers, Paasche and Carver (1997) used parent participation in meetings of 
community organizations, church youth groups involving their children and parental 
involvement in school affairs from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey. 
 
Although there are surveys where social capital indicators can be obtained it has not been 
possible to get a single variable to its measurement, this is due to several reasons: 1) 
definitions of social capital are multidimensional with different levels and units of analysis, 2) 
any attempt to measure concepts such as trust, networks, collaboration, participation and 
organization is problematic, mainly by lack of agreement about its meaning, 3) few long-term 
surveys are designed to measure social capital so as to compare results over time, and 4) some 
social capital indicators are only at national level but not in more disaggregated units of 
analysis like at the municipal level as the case of measures of trust in government, voter 
trends, members of civil society organizations, hours given to voluntary work. 
 
Other social capital indicators are obtained through approaches to other variables. The 
variable commonly used is inequality, measured by different indices: Robin Hood, coefficient 
of variation. There is evidence of a strong negative correlation between social capital and 
inequality although there is not defined the causal relationship, usually social capital explains 
a more equitable income distribution (Coleman, 1988) but in others income inequality 
explains social capital for example Knack and Keefer (1997) and Putnam (2000) where the 
decrease in inequality leads to more investment in social capital.  
 
Some other studies relate social capital with income measures, for example Boisjoly, Duncan, 
and Hofferth (1995) measure social capital through the monetary and time support received 
for a household from family and friends, they found that people with higher incomes have 
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greater access to cash assistance and people with low incomes have greater time help. 
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) estimated social capital with the extent and characteristics of 
people associational activity and their confidence in various institutions and individuals, this 
measure was associated with data from household income in rural communities, they found 
that social capital increases household income. 
 
Other studies relate social capital with inequality measures, for example Kawachi, Kennedy, 
Lochner, and Prothrow-Stith (1997) estimated social capital with solidarity groups’ density 
and the portion of individuals who believe that people could be confident. They inferred that 
investment in social capital reduces income inequality. Robison and Siles (1997) used as 
social capital indicators family integrity (percentage of households with female heads with 
children), educational level (percentage of graduates from high school), crime variables (rates 
of litigation) and employment variables (rates of labor force participation), they found that 
social capital changes have an effect on the level and disparity of household income. 
 
The most common forms of social capital investment consists in share a social network, these 
networks can be formed by different types of people with common characteristics and have 
minimum social distance. People who have these characteristics create trust, loyalty and 
cooperation which could lead to flows of information, saving time and resources in physical 
and monetary terms.  
 
There is empirical evidence of this kind of social capital investment like the networks built 
through microcredit groups (Knaff and Keefer, 1997, Narayan and Pritchett 1997, Temple and 
Johnson, 1998; Portes, 1995; Karageorgis and Light, 1994, Heller, 1996 ). These studies show 
that social capital generates information channels, facilitates transactions and reduces costs in 
these credit mechanisms. For example, lack of access to credit for the poor in developing 
countries is a consequence of the limited information and the risk that the credit applicants 
imply. Through social capital agreements are obtained and these problems are reduced in the 
imperfection of information and therefore the credits are provided. Networks and trsut 
attitudes reduce the opportunistic behavior of some community members, for example the 
peer pressure mechanism in microfinance is used to prevent default problems. Using this tools 
social capital will be analized and measured. 
 
3. Characteristics of financial exclusion  
 
In Mexico there is limited access to formal banking services and delays in funding. For 
example, financial intermediaries, including banks, are serving less than 40% of the 
population and 77% of users know little of the bank contracts. The alternative of expanding 
the popular financial sector to cover the 60% remaining has had poor results and the Popular 
Savings and Credit Law (LACP) recently approved has created obstacles to financial 
intermediaries that serve this sector. On the one hand, the approval has reduced costs but also 
has decreased the flexibility to be adapted to the needs of this population1. 
 
The microfinance sector has not achieved a greater coverage and penetration in Mexico, 
especially in rural areas, for example 80% of people from rural communities use cash as the 
only mean of payment, the savings system with more penetration is the informal through the 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association or ROSCA, “home savings”, solidarity cooperatives 
                                                          
1
 Survey of Financial Culture in Mexico, 2008. Banamex-UNAM. 
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for savings and savings with friends and parents. The 69% of the population lacks information 
on financial products and services. This sector has failed to adapt their products to local 
demands and present problems of past-due loans, 77% of financial services users say they 
know and understand little or nothing of the contracts in this sector, 2 of 10 people surveyed 
had a record of their debts, expenses, income and savings, and 7 of 10 people are not 
informed about services and charges of financial instruments (BANAMEX-UNAM)
 1
. 
Additionally, the creation by the sector of new technologies and products (which is limited) 
has been based on different characteristics of financial infrastructure. 
 
The formal financial services access for poor people is difficult considering that they don’t 
have guarantees. The banks have no interest in small crops, animals, or appliances. In some 
cases, poor people have an acceptable guarantee (their lands), however, they can not use them 
because the lack of a legal property title, the same goes for the mortgage (Mansell, 1995). 
Therefore, banks are based just on the credit history (information missing in the case of the 
poor) or in the income level (which is usually irregular considering the unemployment 
periods). The lack of information and the credit risk of these borrowers, in addition to high 
interest rates and the situation described above exclude the poor from the formal financial 
markets. 
 
Many times transaction costs may be higher on loans for the poor than for higher income 
individuals because the credit monitoring and contract enforcement are more difficult for the 
poor. Alternatively lenders raise the interest rates to a certain level
2
 to cover their costs. Thus, 
financial intermediaries in equilibrium ration the credit giving this to customers that imply 
less research and monitoring costs and whose contracts are cheaper to enforce. Even in the 
informal financial sector interest rates do not balance the markets
3
 and credit rationing exists. 
 
Moreover, the transaction costs facing the poor are also large. The cost in time for the poor is 
also high. As there are few intermediaries from the formal financial sector in low-income 
areas, if poor people go to the bank may cause a few hours off from work, it could also 
represent to walk long distances, take several transport and, quite possibly, make long lines. 
May involve also filling forms difficult to understand, time and effort to gather the required 
documentation. These reasons explain why low-income borrowers are not only excluded from 
credit markets in the formal sector but also from many informal sources of financing. 
 
4. Social capital in the solidarity funds  
 
Social capital in microfinance works through ties of solidarity, neighborhood and community 
organization, its principal asset is the trust (Coleman, 1990) and operates through the social 
collateral, peer monitoring and peer pressure. Mechanisms that foster linkages and strengthen 
their solidarity bonds are the selfselection, groups of small size, the homogeneity among the 
members and their population density (Bastelaer, 1999). Social capital in microfinance 
provides substitutes with respect to individual collateral and generates low-cost alternatives 
for lenders. 
 
Social capital is expressed in the solidarity funds on participation and how this financial 
instrument is set up: the producers met voluntary to establish the funds. The members are 
                                                          
2
The interest rates are raised until the level that the highest marginal rates increase the probability of default, 
which would reduce their profits. 
3
 Some times up to 10% per day. 
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involved in the process of creation and modification of statutes and operation rules, they are 
also involved in the designing, monitoring and evaluation process, which reduces their costs. 
They decide who can become a member because they have information about the members of 
their communities. 
 
The members are also the owners and those responsible for recovery. Using the peer 
monitoring and peer pressure schemes they can reduce the fraud or default problems. The 
member’s participation in the creation, discussion of operation rules, organization and 
monitoring enables them to adapt to the specific needs and expectations of the members. 
Members participate attending meetings with all the members involved to take decisions on 
the issues concerning to the group. 
 
The funds representatives are selected in the General Assembly members by majority vote, 
their positions are honorary in nature and therefore not remunerated for their performance. 
Members may be elected to any administrative post or representation. The members through 
the local credit committee decide who can be a member among themselves as they are known. 
But they can also deny entry of a person when the applicant is known for his dishonesty and 
disrepute in the community. This selection mechanism has a positive effect in preventing risks 
of fraud or default problems. 
 
These members represent the social guarantee that applicants need to obtain a loan. For 
example, in the case of solidarity loans the members could be the social collateral for loans. 
Also members are responsible for monitoring the performance of their managers and the use 
of its funds through the supervisory boards, management and credit committees. The funds 
keep a record of each member in addition to the books and the register of members at 
meetings. This monitoring tool allows the management team transparent attempts to minimize 
fraud and providing security to the members. 
 
The operation system of the funds has its own implicit social oversight mechanism. Some 
attempted fraud has been avoided. However, in the case of fraud or default the board of 
directors temporarily suspended or expelled them from the Fund. But the punishment goes 
beyond an economic fraud, it is a social destitution preventing their access to various 
community activities and limiting their access to the benefits of public services and assets 
created with the resources of the funds. 
 
Responsibility and trust between members allows getting loans without excessive collateral. 
To the extent that customers are also owners and correspondents of the fund administration, it 
reduces the temptation not to pay and reduces the presence of fraud. In the event they were 
presented their social system controller can detect them in time. This situation reduces the risk 
of bankruptcy preventing its spread to other funds from other regions. 
 
On the other hand, the solidarity funds do not have the permission of the National Banking 
and Securities Commission (CNBV by its initials in Spanish) to operate as entities of Savings 
and Loan Associations (EACPs by its initials in Spanish) in terms of the the Popular Savings 
and Credit Law (LACP by its initials in Spanish) because they are civil societies. They are not 
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP by its initials in 
Spanish), or the inspection and supervision of the CNBV, or are located in the rules of the 
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Savings and Loan Societies (SAPs), but they have auxiliar supervision and technical 
assistance from a Federation
4
 and are considered by the LACP. 
 
The funds have not been able to adjust their operation to the requirements established by the 
LACP, they are not required to comply with prudential rules as they apply only to entities that 
are subject to regulation by the SAPs and CNBV as credit unions or well as public financial 
institutions like Banrural. 
 
The funds are not SAPs because the requirements are costly and complicated for them. For 
example, they are obliged to contract managers and administrators with five and ten years of 
work experience, the call for its annual meetings have to be published ten days in advance in 
the newspapers of greatest circulation in the area, and the opening hours are rigid, Monday to 
Friday and weekends remain closed. 
 
These requirements are difficult to fulfill in most of the funds. First, because there are 
populations in which the low level of education of its members is very difficult to secure staff 
with technical training, second, by its geographical dispersion, many of these communities 
have no access to newspapers or the media, and third, as regards the schedule, the weekend is 
when the members of the country side and surrounding communities come to town, where 
usually the offices of the solidarity funds are installed. 
 
This status limits the financial development of the funds and prevents them from having the 
backing of the banking authorities, this still is not an obstacle to their development, but may 
be in the future. So, while for internal management, the funds do have statutes and rules of 
operation approved by the membership, it is necessary that they are supported and count with 
an appropriate legislation. In this sense, social capital has a special advantage on the legal 
aspect of the solidarity funds, its mechanisms of operation, supervision and control of funds 
gives them confidence and certainty to the partners on the use and recovery of resources, 
which could not be done otherwise, because its legal situation they can not be govern under 
other statutes, and do imply a high cost for the funds or change their social denomination. In 
this sense, the mechanisms for participation, selection, supervision and monitoring act as 
substitutes for legal mechanisms and oversight. 
 
5. Income transfers and social capital model  
 
Social capital has been estimated through opinion surveys and indirect measures like 
inequality indices such as the Robin Hood index and the coefficient of variation. The results 
have shown that income inequality is negatively associated with social capital which suggests 
that inequality, through a suitable functional form, can be a proxy of the social capital. 
 
In order to find a theoretical proxy of the social capital through its relationship with inequality 
it will be used the following model. This shows the inverse relationship between social capital 
and inequality, through four indexes: Robin Hood, coefficient of variation, Gini and relative 
deprivation. The indicator of social capital consists of the resources offered by a person and 
relates theoretically with a coefficient of sympathy. This represents the degree to which a 
person incorporates the welfare of another in his utility function and that leads to sharing 
resources with other. 
 
                                                          
4
 Federación Nacional de Cajas Solidarias, A.C. 
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In this way Social capital is observed in the transfer of income, an individual with more 
income is concerned about an individual with less income because there is a relation of 
sympathy between them (if there is positive social capital). The individual with more income 
is interested to raise the welfare of the other with less income by transferring part of his 
income, generating thus a redistribution of income inequality that favors the worse. This 
behavior is pleased for both because the higher income individual raises his social capital 
invested in the poorer individual, and therefore his utility, and the individual with less income 
is receiving a transfer. 
 
In this model there are two individuals (i and j) with equal utility functions, Cobb-Douglas 
type. Their functions depend on the final income itself (Ifi) and the final income of another 
individual (Ifj), which in turn depends on the amount of social capital between the two that is 
represented by a coefficient K. If social capital is positive an increase in the income of 
individual j will give satisfaction to individual i, the opposite happens when social capital is 
negative, when K=0 any change in the income of j is indifferent to i. In this model social 
capital is assumed positive. The following are the utility functions for individuals i and j: 
 
i i j
K
U If If        (1) 
j j i
K
U If If        (2)
  
It is assumed that social capital is equal for i and j individuals (Kij=Kji=K) since the two 
individuals feel sympathy for one another in the same way. The income elasticity is given by 
the social capital coefficient K=(Ui/ Ifj)(Ifj/Ui), and lies between 0 and 1 (0<K<1), i.e. each 
individual appreciate the other, but do not appreciated him as well as himself. If K<1, the 
individual i appreciate more an increase of one percent of his final income than an increase of 
one percent of the final income of the individual j. If K=1, i appreciate the final income of j as 
much as himself, if K>1 is more important for i the final income of j than his personal income, 
if K=0 individual i does not appreciate to j. 
 
The final income of i and j individuals is given by the sum of the initial income (Io) and net 
transfers (Tn), i.e. what an individual has minus the amount of transfers he gives (Ifi=Ioi+Tni 
y Ifj=Ioj+Tnj). These net transfers consist of transfers received (Tr) minus transfers given (Tt) 
(Tni=Tri-Tti y Tnj=Trj-Ttj). Individuals will only differ from each other by their initial 
incomes, i.e, at the beginning there is inequality in their allocation of income. 
In this model it is assumed zero transaction costs, i.e. transfers which gives the individual i are 
equal to the transfers received by individual j, in turn, transfers received from the individual i 
are equal to those granted by the individual j (Trj=Tti y Tri=Ttj). In this model the total 
income of individuals does not change otherwise income distribution could be affected by 
factors other than transfers, therefore, the income of the economy is fixed, the amount of final 
incomes of i an j is equal to total income of the economy (It=Ifi+Ifj). In this economy, each 
individual transfers part of his income to another according to his preferences, thus generating 
a reallocation of income. The following explains the distribution graphically. 
 
Diagram 1 
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Ij
Ii
B
Ui
Ifj
Ifi
Ioj
Ioi
Trj
Tti Ioi+Ioj=It
A
 
In point A are located the initial allocations of income. In point B the individual i, according 
to his preferences decided to transfer part of his income to the individual j, which changed the 
distribution increasing the income of i and decreasing the income of i. The line It is the sum 
of individuals’ incomes and is equal to the total income of the economy. If there is not social 
capital, the individual i is not worried about the individual j and the distribution would be 
equal to the original allocation located at point A, but because i feels sympathy for j, then i is 
concerned by j and try to benefit him transferring part of his income, thus changing the 
original distribution of income, standing now at the point B. If the final distribution has 
incorporated social capital this could mean that the distribution is an indirect measure of 
social capital. Thus, the social capital measure is the change of the initial distribution with 
respect to the final distribution, i.e. the difference between A and B. 
 
On the other hand, the only thing an individual can control are the transfers granted (Tt). The 
initial income (Io) and the transfers received (Tr) are exogenous, then the variable that will 
determine the model is Tt. Therefore, the maximization problem arises in terms of transfers 
granted. Substituting the equation of final income and net transfer equation in the utility 
function of each individual will get the problem of maximization of i and j. 
                           
iTt
MaxU Io Tr Tt Io Tt Tti i i i j i j
k
                               
                           
jTt
MaxU Io Tr Tt Io Tt Ttj j j j i j i
k
      
 
The first order conditions (Ui/Tti y Uj/Ttj) are as follows: 
               


i
i
j i j
k
i i i j i j
KU
Tt
Io Tt Tt Io Tr Tt Io Tt TtK         
1
0  
               


j
j
i j i
K
j j j i j i
KU
Tt
Io Tt Tt Io Tr Tt Io Tt TtK         
1
0  
Substituting again the final income of i and j individuals in the first order conditions it gives 
the following optimization conditions. 
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For   i       IfIf
If
If
ji
i
j
KK  or                                  
For   j       IfIf
If
If
ij
j
i KK  or                                  
Just one of these two conditions applies. If there is inequality the individual who has more 
income transfers, the individual with less income is the receiver. In this model is not possible 
that the two individuals transfer at the same time. The following are the transfer’s allocation 
from i to j (diagram 2) and from j to i (diagram 3). 
 
Diagram 2                                                                   Diagram 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the optimization condition of i, individual i can not receive income from j, the 
only thing he can do is to transfer part of his income to j for this he has to move from right to 
left on the line of total income. The optimization condition of i is at the point Bi (Ifj=KIfi). 
The line where the point Bi is located is different to the curve of 45° because the individual is 
concerned about the other, but less than himself, i.e. K is smaller than one. The initial income 
of j is at point A. 
 
If the initial income of j was in the point Bi, then i would no longer need to transfer part of his 
income to j. But if the endowment income of j is at a point on the right of the optimization 
condition of i, individual i can continue granting to j until the point Bi. In the event that the 
initial income of j is above the condition of maximization, i can not continue to grant transfers 
to j because that would be to move away from the point Bi
5
. Therefore, in the dotted line 
which is above the optimal point Bi, i will not transfer income to j. This is shown in the 
following equations: 
                                                          
5
 If the endowment income of j is found to the left of A, and i would like to move from left to right transferring 
income to j to reach his optimal point, this would be like stealing income to j, producing a reduction of j’s 
income that instead of helping him it would hurt him. This behavior of i to j shows negative social capital. 
 
 
45° 
Ij 
Bi 
Ii 
IfiK=Ifj 
Ifi=Ifj 
Ioj 
Ioi 
A 
Ifi 
Ifj 
 
Bj 
A 
45° 
Ij 
IfjK=Ifi 
Ii 
Ifi=Ifj 
Ioj 
Ioi Ifi 
Ifj 
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0I
0I


TtIoIo
TtIoIo
iij
iij
Kf
Kf
 
When there is social capital and j feels sympathy for i, j will transfer to i, in doing so reduce 
his income by moving from left to right on the line of total income (It). His condition 
optimization is in the point Bj (Ifi=KIfj). This behavior is shown in Diagram 3. In the case of 
j, where the initial income of i is above the optimization condition of j, as in A, then j will 
transfer part of his income to i, but if the initial income of i is below the point Bj, j will not 
transfer income to i because if he did it he will move away from the maximization condition, 
hence on the dotted line that is below Bj, individual j will not transfer to i. This is shown in 
the following equations: 
                                
0
0I


TtIoIo
TtIoIo
jji
jji
KIf
Kf
 
In the pre-conditions for maximization of Bi and Bj, where i transferred income to j and j to i, 
there is a relationship between social capital and inequality, in these areas one individual 
transfers to another and to be able to carry out such a transfer should be sympathetic 
relationship in which one wants to improve the other. In addition, for this to happen is 
necessary an inequality situation where one has more income than another and wants to 
benefit the other transferring some part of his own income. 
 
Diagram 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The areas where there is a relationship between inequality and social capital are located in 
areas not dotted of the total income line, in the spaces above the conditions of optimization. In 
the dotted area, although there is social capital between i and j there is no relation between 
social capital and inequality because there is no imbalance which encourages both i and j to 
transfer income away from the optimum. 
 
In the area located to the right of Bi, where individual i transfers to j, is achieved optimization 
condition of i and j condition is irrelevant because it can not be reached. In the same way in 
the area that lies to the left of Bj where j transfers to i, the maximization condition of j is 
reached but i condition is irrelevant. In the dotted area may be the income of both, but their 
 Ij 
IfjK=Ifi 
Bj 
Bi 
Ii 
IfiK=Ifj 
It=Ioi+Ioj 
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conditions can be achieved. If a condition applies the other not, therefore, only one condition 
can be observed at a time. Thus, the case of individual i can be analized, which transfers 
income to j. 
 
Previously the final income of individual i was defined as follows: Ifi=Ioi+Tri-Tti, but 
considering the case where only the optimization condition of i applied, i only transfers 
income and do not get it, then his received transfers are zero and his final income is as 
follows: Ifi=Ioi-Tti. Considering the individual j case, j only receives transfers from i and not 
grants them, then, transfers granted from j are zero and his final income is: Ifj=Ioj+Trj. So in 
the case where only the i’s condition apply, the transfers that i grants are the transfers that j 
receives, so the transfers are redefined as T and final incomes of i and j are as follows Ifi=Ioi-
T y Ifj=Ioj+T. Substituting these equations in the optimization condition of i the transfers 
given by i and received by i are obtained: 
 
             T
K
K
i jIo Io


1
                               
 
Furthermore, by substituting this equation in Ifi=Ioi-T and redefining the total income as 
It=Ioi+Ioj final income of i is obtained which depends on the total income and the sympathy 
coefficient Ifi=[It/(1+K)], in the same way by replacing the transfers equation in Ifj=Ioj+T 
final income of j is obtained, it is expressed as follows Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)]. The average final 
income of the two individuals involved in this economy is given by I̅f= (Ifi+Ifj)/2. Now, 
different income inequality indices are incorporated to the model to observe the relationship 
of social capital with inequality. These indices are: the Robin Hood index, the coefficient of 
variation, the Gini index and the index of relative deprivation. These indices were selected 
based on the argument that the gap between rich and poor is contributing to lower levels of 
social cohesion and trust (Kawachi, et. al., 1997) and that inequality causes a feeling of envy 
and injustice that discourages investment in social capital (Podder, 1996)
 6
. 
 
Robin Hood Index 
 
The Robin Hood Index is defined as the proportion of aggregate income to be transferred 
from households above the median income to the households located below the mean in 
oreder to achieve equality in income distribution (Atkinson, 1992). Thus, the Robin Hood 
index in this economy is as follows: RH=Ifi- I̅f in the case of individual i. Substituting the 
equations of final income and average income in the Robin Hood index, it is expressed as 
follows: RH=(Ifj-Ifj)/2. Now considering the final income of i and j in the Robin Hood index, 
it is redefined as follows: RH=0.5*{[(1-K)It]/(1+K)}. The Robin Hood index in absolute terms 
corresponds to RH=(Ifj-Ifj)/2, in relative terms it is given by the ratio of the index and the 
total income (rh=RH/It). So replacing the equation of the RH index found in the relative 
Robin Hood index it is obtained the following result: rh=0.5*[(1-K)/(1+K)]. 
 
                                                          
6
  “There is a direct relationship between the degree of inequality and the extension of the injustice sense in 
society, with consequent dissatisfaction that causes conflicts of class," this sense of injustice caused by 
inequality hinders social collaboration for the welfare and discourages investment in social capital. 
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Thus, the Robin Hood index shows a negative relationship between social capital and 
inequality: the higher social capital between i and j the lower income inequality in this 
economy. Developing the equation of social capital, social capital is then defined in terms of 
inequality: K=[1-(2*rh)]/[1+(2*rh)]. In this equation the maximum value of the rh index is a 
half because there are only two individuals in this economy, i.e. if an individual had 100% of 
income it should withdraw the 50% and move to another individual to reach perfect equality. 
If there are a large number of individuals, the maximum value of the Robin Hood index tends 
to one because it has to be redistributed the 100% of income if an individual is concentrating 
all the income. Therefore the formula for large populations related with social capital is the 
following: 
      K
rh
rh



1
1
                                                         
 
From this definition an inverse relationship between social capital and inequality is observed, 
as measured by the Robin Hood Index. It is noteworthy that the relationship between these 
two variables is nonlinear; an approximation could be a logarithmic functional relationship in 
which social capital grows more rapidly than the Robin Hood index reduces. 
 
Coeficient of variation 
 
On the other hand the coefficient of variation is the standard deviation between the average 
incomes; it can be defined as follows: 
     1
1
2
1
2 








 

n
i
i
Ifn
CV
If
                                                 
 
Substituting equations Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)] in the equation above would be the 
following expression: CV
2
=(0.5*{It
2
/[(1+K)
2
*If
2
]+(K
2
*It
2
)/[(1+K)
2
*If
2
]})-1. Since It
2
/I̅2=n2 
and n=2, then the equation above would be defined as follows: CV
2
={0.5*[4/(1+K)
2
+ 
(K
2
*4)/(1+K)
2
]}-1. Then social capital could be expressed in terms of the coefficient of 
variation. 
CV
CV
K



1
1
                                                       
It is important to observe the similarity between the equation of social capital obtained from 
the Robin Hood index and the results from the coefficient of variation, both equations 
coincide because this economy is formed by two individuals. Now, obtaining the fisrt order 
condition from CV
2
=0.5*{4/(1+K)
2
+ (K
2
*4)/(1+K)
2
}-1 we obtain the following expression: 
δCV2/δK=-[4/(1+K)3]+[(4*K2)/(1+K)3] +[(4*K)/(1+K)2].  From this expression it is inferred 
that if K 0, i do not appreciate an increase in the final income of j, then  CV2/ K<0, i.e. a 
decline in social capital brings about an increase in inequality, represented by the coefficient 
of variation. Moreover, if K=1, i appreciate the final income of j as much as himself, then 
CV2/ K=0. From these it follows that at any point in the range 0 <K <1, K increases if CV 
decreases. 
 
Gini Index 
 
The Gini index is the average relative distance of each individual with respect to the other; 
this can be expressed as follows: 
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G
If n
If If
i
n
i j
j
n
  
1 1 1
22
       
 
Incorporating the equations Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)]  in the above equation gives the 
following expression: G=(1/ I̅ )*(1/4){[It/(1+K)]-[(KIt)/(1+K)]}. Developing the equation it is 
obtained the following relationship between social capital and inequality: K=(1-2G)/(1+2G). 
As in the Robin Hood index the outcome for this equation is given for two individuals, 
generalizing for n individuals it would be obtained the following expression: 
 K
G
G



1
1
      
Again, social capital remains an inverse relationship with inequality, such behavior shows a 
nonlinear relationship, like the Robin Hood index and the coefficient of variation. 
 
Relative Deprivation Index 
 
This index is an economic measure of relative deprivation; it shows the envy feeling through 
economic inequality. Empirical studies that have used this index relate this to social cohesion 
as social capital measure. Considering the case of two individuals, when an individual with 
envy feelings is compared with another that has no envy it arises a sense of relative 
deprivation (PR). Equality is the ideal state of society but if there are disparities between 
individuals then it is perceived disadvantage in the sense of relative deprivation. 
 
This index does not show the same upper limits as the other indices. In the three indices above 
the maximum (M) is achieved when an individual receives all the income but in the relative 
deprivation index the maximum is somewhere in an interior point between the upper and 
lower limits of the inequality. This is because individuals are not compared with the 
individual who possesses all the income but with the situation of the other he feels envy. 
Considering this, the relative deprivation index (IPR) would be expressed as follows
7
: 












 1
2
ln
2
lnln where,
2
n
Itn
MandPR
M
PR
IPR IfIf
ji
           
In the equation represented by M, Ii<Ij, i is the individual who is disadvantaged in this 
economy, he is the one who expresses the sense of relative deprivation. Because n = 2 in this 
economy, then M=ln(It-1). Now incorporating the incomes of i and j individuals in equations 
Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)] and the maximum value (M) for n = 2, the IPR would be as 
follows : IPR={ln[It/(1+K)]- ln[ItK/(1+K)]}/ln(It-1). The social capital in terms of the relative 
deprivation index could be expressed as follows: 
 
K
It
IPR

1
1
                                                    
There is also an inverse relationship between social capital and the relative deprivation index, 
but this relationship is different from that presented by the Robin Hood Index, the coefficient 
of variation and the Gini index, this is due to the difference that exists in their maximum 
values. Although in the equations obtained an inverse association between social capital and 
inequality is inferred a causality is assumed as follows KS= f (Desigualdad) based on the 
arguments of Kawachi, et. al. (1997) and Podder (1996). 
                                                          
7
 Podder, Nripesh, “Relative Deprivation, Envy ad Economic Inequality”, KYKLOS, vol. 49, 1996, Fasc. 3, pp. 
353-376, ecuaciones 8, 13 y 15.  
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6. Estimation of the social capital indicator  
 
The similarities of social capital with other capital suggests that social capital can be studied 
with standard economic tools, this is to invest or disinvest in social capital can be seen as an 
economic problem of allocating resources. Social capital is measured by its association with 
other variables through the extrapolation method (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000a. 2002; 
Heckman et al. 1990). It is considered this method for the analysis period (1994) because 
there is no statistical information of social capital at the state level or municipality level which 
is the maximum level of disaggregation used, and it is necessary to get social capital 
information at the municipality level to discusse the financial information for each of the 
solidarity funds. 
 
In the estimations of social capital, there are used two methods, the first is derived from the 
model developed and has the following functional form: KS=(1-D)/(1+D) where D is any of 
the inequality indexes listed in theoretical model. The second method concerns the estimation 
of an equation that incorporates social capital indicators and indices of inequality and that also 
shows a negative relationship between social capital and inequality: KS=1 + 2 
Desigualdad+u.  
 
Indicators of social capital were obtained from the World Values Survey for 43 countries with 
market economies from the waves of the periods 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 
1999-2004. These surveys were considered because they include the periods of analysis, the 
period for which solidarity funds information is obtained. Indicators of social capital were 
built from the following questions: most people can be trust, young people trust in older 
people, older people trust in young people, trust: other people in country, how much  do you 
trust your family, confidence on churches, armed forces, education system, the press, the 
government, among others, and to belong to voluntary, ecology, human rights and social 
welfare among others. A pooling with the different waves was made and generates a size 
sample of 144 countries. 
 
Indicators of social capital were based on Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1993) 
and Gellner (1994) who believe that social capital contributes to better development of the 
institutions either at macro or micro level , this article will analise the social capital in 
microfinance institutions such as solidarity funds. They point out that trust promotes 
cooperation between people and this produce a better development of the institutions because 
the active participation of citizens to collaborate, monitor, critique and limits restrict 
predatory tendencies and positively affect their performance. 
 
Under some proves just trust indicator was statistically significative then just the trust 
indicator was used. The trust indicator was built using the percentage of people in a country 
that responded "a lot of people trust" to the question: "In general, can you trust people or you 
have to be very careful when dealing with them?"; for countries reported the average value 
was 36.6% and the standard deviation was 14.2. To construct the indicators of inequality was 
used the countries income from the annual report of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the percentage of household income, according to the quintile in which 
the units are located to each of the 144 countries surveyed for a near period to the mentioned 
waves. 
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It was built a pooling data from the 4 waves used for the survey periods 1981-1984, 1989-
1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 to generate a sample with 144 observations, taking into 
account the countries that were reported in either survey. The social capital was estimated 
with the inequality for the period mentioned with a dummy variable for the period 1989-1993, 
1994-1999 and 1999-2004 (LnKS=1+2Desigualdad+3Dummy+u). These dummys were 
not significatives, so we can expect that the union of the period metioned does not create 
problems in the estimation of social capital. 
 
To test the relationship between social capital and income inequality the following equation: 
LnKS= 1 + 2LnDesigualdad+u,  was estimated where LnKs is the natural logarithm of the 
variable of social capital built with the indicators described above. We used the logarithmic 
form because there is theoretical evidence for the existence of a nonlinear relationship. The 
results obtained with OLS were: 
 
Estimations of the social capital indicator with four inequality indexes 
 
Trust = 1 + 2Inequality+…+nXn+u
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Independent variables 
 
I II III IV V 
Gini1 -0.3510*** 
(0.1028) 
    
Gini2  -0.3493*** 
(0.0897) 
   
CV   -16.1594*** 
(5.5961) 
  
Robin Hood    -0.4280*** 
(0.1497) 
 
IPR     -0.2728*** 
(0.0952) 
Education middle -0.1086* 
(0.0537) 
-0.0339 
(0.0580) 
-0.0337 
(0.0584) 
-0.0330 
(0.0585) 
-0.0346 
(0.0584) 
Education upper 0.1644* 
(0.0796) 
0.1551* 
(0.0937) 
0.1502* 
(0.0953) 
0.1523* 
(0.0952) 
0.1595* 
(0.0947) 
Political corruption -0.1075* 
(0.0668) 
-0.1390*** 
(0.0669) 
-0.1399*** 
(0.0671) 
-0.1407*** 
(0.0671) 
-0.1333** 
(0.0673) 
Sex (male) 0.1420 
(0.3343) 
0.2978 
(0.3318) 
0.2928 
(0.3399) 
0.3014 
(0.3398) 
0.3250 
(0.3388) 
Age (15-29 years old) -0.1332 
(0.1260) 
-0.0272 
(0.1328) 
-0.0263 
(0.1401) 
-0.0294 
(0.1400) 
-0.0326 
(0.1392) 
Age (30-49 years old) -0.0272 
(0.1546) 
-0.0283 
(0.1560) 
-0.0228 
(0.1565) 
-0.0265 
(0.1566) 
-0.0420 
(0.1566) 
Stable relationship -0.0402* 
(0.0428) 
-0.1014*** 
(0.0505) 
-0.1023** 
(0.0516) 
-0.1021** 
(0.0516) 
-0.1022** 
(0.0516) 
Household ownership 0.2259* 
(0.1410) 
0.1160*** 
(0.0533) 
0.1102*** 
(0.0536) 
0.1142*** 
(0.0535) 
0.1224*** 
(0.0535) 
Save money past year 0.0734 
(0.0777) 
-0.0608 
(0.0880) 
-0.0566 
(0.0884) 
-0.0592 
(0.0885) 
-0.0681 
(0.0888) 
Population 0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
GDP real 0.00001*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
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Constant 30.5899 
(16.0671) 
16.3851 
(15.6772) 
15.2458 
(16.5097) 
15.5932 
(16.5496) 
14.1325 
(16.4541) 
n 144 133 132 132 132 
R
2
 0.5075 0.5316 0.5429 0.5322 0.5324 
R Adjusted 0.4624 0.4847 0.4858 0.4851 0.4852 
F 11.25 11.35 11.48 11.28 11.29 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The Gini2 is refered to the adjusted Gini by population. The terms in parenthesis are refered to the values of the 
standard errors. Significance levels are ***(99%), **(95%) and  *(90%).  
 
The estimation was conducted using the five indexes mentioned above and the values of 
social capital index from the World Values Surveys for the countries reported, this was done 
in order to ascertain the best estimate of the capital. Only in the estimation of trust the five 
estimators of inequality were significant (the coefficient of variation, the Gini1 index, the 
Gini2 index, the Robin Hood and the Relative Deprivation index), the remainder of the 
estimated social capital indices were not significant. In the trust estimation the all the 
inequality indexes were significative but the CV show better statistical estimators. Then the 
coefficient of variation presented best statistical and hence was selected as the best index to 
estimate the social capital variable. Control cariables were used to control country 
heterogeneity. 
 
Once it was found the best indicator of social capital (trust) and the best proxy for estimating 
the social capital (the coefficient of variation) were the estimated the social capital from 
Mexico at state level using the values of the coefficient of variation for the country. The 
coefficient of variation for Mexico was built using information from the total current income 
of households by deciles of the National Survey of Income and Expenditure of Households 
comparable (1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 1996). The estimate of the method 1 incorporated 
into the coefficient of variation into the equation K = (1-CV / 1 + CV) to get the values of the 
social capital for each year. This equation is derived from the indicator obtained through the 
theoretical model. In Method 2 it was estimated trust variable, which represents the social 
capital, also incorporating the coefficient of  variation built and imputated  from the values 
obtained from the coefficients 1 and 2into the equation LnTrust=1+2LnCV+u  where 
LnTrust is an nonlinear indicator and represents the trsut variable and CV is the coefficient of 
variation. The results with both methods are presented in the following table: 
 
Estimations of social capital for Mexico under the two methods 
Year of the 
ENIGH 
Variation 
Coefficient 
Method 1 
K=(1-CV
1
)/(1+CV
1
) 
Method 2 
Trust = 1 + 2 CV+u 
1984 0.8703 0.3725 22.32 
1989 1.0141 0.3049 16.85 
1992 1.0251 0.3000 16.49 
1994 1.0333 0.2963 16.23 
1996 0.9746 0.3228 18.21 
Source: INEGI, National Survey of Income and Expenditure of Household, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 
1996.              
1
 To develop the calculations there were used the adjusted coefficiet of variation given by the functional 
form of the theoretical model.  
 
The results of social capital obtained under the first method are related to the percentage of 
sympathy who feel people and is represented by the KS parameter from the utility function 
and correspond to an index in which a value of zero percent means that there is no social 
capital and 1 percent means that households have so much sympathy for others as for 
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themselves. Regarding the second method, the values obtained are related to the percentage of 
households that trust, for example, in 1996, 18.21% percent of households reported by the 
ENIGH trusted people, that is, they have social capital. 
 
The results show the following trends: 1984 to 1994 the coefficient of variation was 
increasing even in marginal terms this increase was shrinking. In the same way the social 
capital estimated under the two methods was decreasing but in smaller proportion, from 1994 
to 1996 the coefficient of variation decreased and social capital, estimated under the two 
methods increased. Therefore there is similar trend in the the behavior of the social capital 
estimated under the two methods and an inverse relationship between social capital and 
inequality. 
 
Once reported national results it was estimated the social capital for the states, with the two 
methods, but only for two years: 1990 and 1995. Were used these years because just in these 
years the income data are available for estates and they are the closest years for which 
statistics are available in the balances reported by the solidarity funds. The information 
corresponds to the XI General Census of Population and Housing 1990 and the Population 
and Housing Count 1995 from the INEGI. 
 
The income information obtained from these two sources is concerning the distribution of 
population by income groups according to minimum wages, from which they were built the 
proportions of income generating Coefficient Variation. Below are two graphs showing the 
behavior of social capital in these two years, estimated with the two methods described. 
 
Diagram 5 
Behaviour of the social capital by states in 1990, 
estimation made with the two methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INEGI, XI General Census of Population and Housing, 1990.  
 
The results of this graph where built with the estimation of social capital with the two 
methods: in method 1 the coefficient of variation of each state was incorporated into the 
equation K= (1-CV /1+CV), in the method 2 it was incorporated also the coefficient of 
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variation of each state and the values of the estimators 1 and 2 were imputed in the equation 
LnTrust = 1 + 2 LnCV+u. The Diagram 1 shows the same behavior of the social capital 
under the two methods. 
 
 In 1990, the five states that showed the highest social capital under the two methods were 
(from highest to lowest) Baja California, Sonora, Colima, Baja California Sur and Sinaloa, 
and those that presented the lowest social capital were (from lowest to highest ) Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Puebla and Guerrero. The interpretation of the value of the social capital 
of the first method refers to the percentage of sympathy who feel people from one state for 
the other. In the second method, the values obtained are related to the percentage of 
population of a state that trust on people. 
 
Diagram 6 
Behaviour of the social capital by states in 1995, 
estimation made with the two methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INEGI, Counting of Population and Housing, 1995. 
 
In 1995, the five states that showed the highest social capital under the two methods were 
(from highest to lowest) Baja California, Mexico, Baja California Sur, Sonora and Nuevo 
Leon, and those with the lowest social capital were (minor to high) Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, Campeche and Yucatan. 
 
In Diagram 2 was observed, as in Diagram 1, similar behavior in the percentages reported in 
the two methods used for estimating social capital, i.e. the states with greater inequality also 
have less social capital. Additionally, there is an inverse relationship between inequality and 
social capital for periods from 1984 to 1994, the coefficient of variation increased and the 
estimated social capital fell. From 1994 to 1996, inequality declined and the social capital 
increase. Thus, the years in which the highest inequality was presented were also the lowest 
investment in capital. Although the social capital at the state level is estimated under these 
two different methods they coincide in their trends and their relationship with inequality. 
Then, social capital can be estimated using an index of inequality as proxy. 
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7. Financial productivity of social capital: development of hypotheses  
 
The literature shows evidence on the productivity of social capital in the sense that it makes 
possible to achieve certain resources that could not be achieved in its absence or could do so 
only at great cost. In the case of microfinances social capital enables access to poor peasant to 
financial services; it helps to achieve financial sustainability by increasing their recoveries 
and reducing costs. To test this argument, productivity is measured through the financial 
products offered by the solidarity funds as they are loans and savings. The performance of the 
solidarity funds is estimated by debts recoveries. 
 
In order to prove that social capital is productive in Solidarity funds it is analyzed the effect of 
social capital (associated with the members, their bearers) in the loans allocation, deposits and 
the loan recoveries. For this purpose the following hypotheses are explored: a) social capital 
affects the solidarity funds productivity, and b) social capital affects the financial performance 
of the solidarity funds. 
 
1. One way to explain the productivity is through costs reduction and financial sustainability, 
this is done by expanding products, so as to generate economies of scale and the average 
cost of serving many small transactions begins to decrease and yields to rise (Johnson and 
Rogaly, 1997). The fact that social capital is productive in the solidarity funds means that 
there is a relationship between the outputs and inputs of the solidarity funds. The products 
supplied by the solidarity funds are loans and savings. The inputs are the loan assets 
integrated by the equity and savings. Members are also inputs because they are the bearers 
of social capital. The relations between outputs and inputs are as follows: 
a) The loans assets depend on the loanable funds and the social capital. 
i. Loanable funds consist of equity and savings. When the solidarity funds back 
their loans with savings can be avoided dependency which creates a greater 
chance of achieving long-term viability (Mansell, 1995). On the other hand, 
because equity are resources that belong to the members they represents a 
healthy way to finance and support the loans. Thus, the more equity and savings 
the greater loans and hence financial viability will be greater. 
ii. Social capital contributes for the approval of loans and hence the loans 
allocation reducing the transaction costs because of the information flow 
provided with this resource. 
b) Savings depend on the equity and social capital. Since each solidarity fund maintains 
its own active and passive interest rates, although these are very similar to the market 
and they are determined periodically by the Administration Board, there are variations 
in rates between fund and fund, this prevents to have registers of the interest rates. For 
this reason it is considered that savings just depend on equity and social capital. 
i. Regarding equity, the greater equity the greater resources available to provide 
financial services in this case to capture savings or deposits. 
ii. It can be expected that savings and investment depend on social capital, because 
there is greater trust from the members to the funds, this could allow increasing 
the deposits in them, which will generate greater financial products. 
2. Social capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity funds. The recovered 
loans are one of the most important indicators of performance. Achieving high rates of 
recovery is a necessary condition for a sustainable microfinance scheme. Loan losses 
represent the largest cost incurred and the main cause of insolvency, lack of liquidity and 
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dependence on government subsidies (Jacob, 1994). It is considered that recovery depends 
on the following relationships: 
a) The recoveries of the borrowed funds are dependent on average loans and the social 
capital. 
i. One of the main incentives for borrowers to pay their loans is the expectation that 
doing so will have greater access to credit. But if the program starts to 
indiscriminate and excessive lending is less likely to recover (Mansell, 1995). 
Therefore, it is expected that the relationship between loans and average recoveries 
were in the form of an inverted parabola, i.e. higher average loan increase 
recoveries, but reach a point where a larger amount lost control, and the recoveries 
are reduced rather than increased. 
ii. Social capital, through its components: peer pressure and peer monitoring, allows 
the loans recovery. Thus, the higher social capital is higher loans recoveries will be. 
 
8. Definition of the econometric equations  
 
The hypothesis will be tested by estimating three equations which imply relations between the 
dependent variables (production and performance) and independent variables (equity, social 
capital and average loans). To test the first hypothesis, social capital is productive; they are 
estimated the services offered by the solidarity funds (savings and loans) through productivity 
equations represented by a Cobb Douglas
8
 type of production as follows: 
 
Y A X X 1 21 2
 
 
 
where Y refers to the product offering the solidarity funds, X1 is the input given by the amount 
of fund resources and X2 is the social capital associated with the producers. By replacing the 
outputs Ys and inputs Xs and applying logarithms the following functions are obtained: 
 
    utalSocialCapiembersLnavingsEquityLnCoansLn  *MSL
21
        (1) 
    utalSocialCapiembersLnLnCavingsLn  *MEquityS
21
                         (2) 
 
Products are given by the number of loans and the number of savings. Considering the 
number and not the amount because the fund transactions reflect the number of operations 
performed and not the amount of them. For example, a producer may be received a loan of 
500 pesos but 5 people may be receive a loan of 100 pesos. The second operation involves 
more transaction costs than the first and this does not mean that the number of transactions 
being carried out is less. 
 
It is proposed a production function with constant returns to scale
9
, the factors coefficients 
represent elasticities products. In equation (1) the product depends on the amount of resources 
                                                          
8
 It was considered a Cobb Douglas function because two characteristics: constant returns to scale (homogeneity 
of degree 1) and the marginal productivity which is positive and decreasing ie marginal returns of productive 
inputs. 
9
 Production increases in the same proportion that inputs increase Xi and Xj. The existence of constant returns to 
scale allows to consider the inputs returns according to their marginal productivity, ie : Y = Pmgxi Xi + Pmgxj 
Xj. In the case of decreasing returns to scale (Y < Pmgxi Xi + Pmgxj Xj)  production would increase by less than 
the input, therefore, the product would be insufficient to make payments to those factors according to their 
marginal productivity, and respect to increasing returns to scale the product would be greater than that payment. 
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available to loan, these come from the equity and the amount of savings. In equation (2) the 
product depends on the equity. The two equations depend on the social capital that is 
embodied by the producers, more producers in the solidarity fund more strengthens the Fund's 
social capital. 
 
To test the second hypothesis, social capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity 
funds, it is used an equation that considers recoveries. It is introduced a squared term because 
it assumes a parabolic relationship where it is expected a positive relationship between the 
average recoveries and loans and a negative relationship with average loans squared. This 
variable was included because it can capture the trend in the average loan and recoveries after 
reaching the peak. The proposed equation is the following: 
 
uM*Capital SocialRecoveries
3
2
21
 embersLoansAverageLoansAverageC         (3) 
 
Recoveries relate to the amount of loan payed, the average loan to the amount of resources 
allocated for producer and social capital is again a variable that is incorporated into the 
number of producers. 
 
It is expected a positive relationship between the average loans and the recoveries because the 
highest average loans the producers will have greater incentives to increase recoveries (it 
refers to the tiered system of credits). The system works as follows, loans are granted to 
producers if they pay their loans they are candidates for a higher credit but if they do not pay 
or incur in moratorium they are not eligible to apply for another loan. Thus, the funds can 
allocate loans to the highest point where they can control the recoveries, beyond that limit 
average loans instead of represent an incentive to the recoveries it may cause frauds and 
decapitalization for the funds. The highest point is the following: 
 
0A2
Recoveries
21



Loansverage
LoansAverage
  
Resolving it is obtained the maximum value of the average loans, which is a function of the 
estimators 1 and 2. 
        


2
1
2
loansofrecoveriesaverage themaximizesV thatalue  
On the other hand, social capital acts as an advocate for recoveries by selecting the best 
candidates to credit through the information flows, the peer pressure and the peer monitoring. 
Thus, it is expected that a greater investment in social capital allow greater loan recoveries of 
loans.The variables used in equations (1), (2) y (3).are described as follows: 
 
a) LLoans. Are the loans logarithms and are of two types: a) authomatic loans and b) 
solidarity loans they are allocated with the approval of a voluntary endorsement. 
b) LLending Funds. Refers to the sum of the equity and the amount of savings in current 
pesos. The equity is comprised of three funds: a) the general reserve, it contributes to 
financial autonomy of the funds and could be used to provide loans, b) contingency 
fund is used to cover any eventuality regarding a financial deficit of the fund, and c) 
promotion and social development is used to support community projects. The amount 
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of savings relates to the resources from the deposits of members through the various 
accounts that record the funds. 
c) LSocialKT.  It refers to the social capital indicator that was built with the 1st. method 
K = (1-CV) / (1 + CV) using the adjusted coefficient of variation. The term describes 
the relationship between this input with their carriers, SocialKT = social capital 
*producers.  
d) LSavings. Refers to the number of transactions from the various savings accounts that 
record the funds as current accounts, systematic savings, youth savings and time 
deposits. 
e) LEquity.It refers to equity described above. 
f) Recoveries. It refers to the total amount of recoveries that are obtained from the loans 
allocated and is the difference between loans allocated and current loans. The current 
loans are those offered by the Funds and are payable in whole or in part, it includes the 
default loans but excludes the overdue loans. 
g) Average Loans. The amount of loans given by the number of members in each 
solidarity fund. 
 
The information of the indicators was obtained from the financial results reported by the 
Solidarity funds at the end of each year except the coefficient of variation; this was built with 
income information of the population living in the municipalities where the funds are located. 
This information refers to the employed population by level of monthly income in minimum 
wages registered by the XI General Census of Population and Housing, 1990, from the 
INEGI. It was took the 1990 Census because is the information at the municipal level closest 
to 1994 that is the year for which information is available from the profits and loss statement 
of the solidarity funds.  
 
9. Estimación de las ecuaciones econométricas 
 
It was used a sample with 54 observations of the 118 Solidarity funds registered in 1994 at the 
municipal level. The selection of this sample size deserves further explanation. The funds 
were constituted in 1992, formally began operations in 1993, his first state of results in 
FONAES was in December 1993. That year the majority of funds had not reported recoveries 
because they distributed credits just few days before or because of the lack of financial 
accounting knowledge with the funds operate. Thus, in December 1994, the second year in 
which they report their results, only 54 of them provided information on loans, savings and 
recoveries. Applying the method of ordinary least squares in the three cross-section equations 
the following estimators were obtained. 
 
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables  
LnLoans LnSavings LnRecoveries 
Ln
1
Loan Funds  
0.7687*** 
(0.1820) 
  
LnEquity 
 0.7684*** 
(0.6478) 
 
Average Loans 
  509.3913*** 
(37.0145) 
Average Loans
 2
 
  -0.0273*** 
(0.0024) 
Ln SocialKT 
0.2927*** 
(0.1351) 
0.5874*** 
(0.4142) 
627.7429
3
*** 
(102.3964) 
Constant -6.6022*** - 5.214** -198693 
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(2.4718) (4.4987) (168445.8) 
Percentage de illiterate population over 15 
years old.  
-0.0230* 
(0.0153) 
-0.0057 
(0.0392 ) 
5511.886 
( 4693.434) 
Percentage of population without primary 
completed aged 15 and more years old 
0.0109 
(0.0119) 
0.0157 
( 0.0297) 
1149.41 
( 4726.741) 
Percentage of households’ occupants without 
toilet or drainage. 
0.0072 
(0.0071) 
-0.0141 
(0.0201) 
-971.921 
( 2024.441) 
Percentage of households’ occupants without 
electricity. 
-0.0015 
(0.0079) 
-0.0027 
( 0.0253) 
672.0309 
( 2181.835) 
Percentage of dwellings without piped water. 
 
-0.0011 
(0.0071) 
0.0202* 
(0.0187) 
3177.239* 
( 1877.545) 
Percentage of households with overcrowding 
 
-0.0173* 
(0.0109) 
-0.0238 
( 0.0309) 
-1886.447 
( 2543.655) 
Percentage of occupants in houses with dirt 
floor 
 
0.0118** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0207* 
( 0.0167) 
-1925.089 
( 2455.353) 
Percentage of population in localities with 
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants 
-0.0045 
(0.0053) 
0.0209** 
( 0.0124) 
-358.7182 
( 1473.258) 
Percentage of population with income less 
than 2 minimum wages 
-0.0168** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0455** 
( 0.0247) 
-4163.998** 
( 2306.558) 
n 54 46 42 
R
2
   0.5945 0.5247 0.9119 
R
2
 adjusted 0.4883 0.4315 0.8754 
1
 Ln=natural logaritm; 
3
there are not included logaritms only in this term because the functional form of the 
recoveries equation. The terms in parentheses refer to the values of the standard errors. Significance levels are 
***(99%), **(95%) y *(90%). The variables were significative in the joined form. 10 
 
Control variables were used from the marginalization index of CONAPO, 1990, such as 
population size, the percentage of illiterate population over 15 years, the percentage of 
population without complete elementary school aged 15 years, the percentage of occupants in 
houses without drainage or excused, the percentage of occupants in houses without electricity, 
the percentage of occupants in houses without piped water, the percentage of households with 
overcrowding, the percentage of occupants in houses with dirt floors, the percentage of the 
population in localities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, the percentage of the population 
with income less than 2 minimum wages. We included these variables as controls in order to 
analyze the effects of social capital in the financial behavior in the municipalities where 
access to financial services is limited and because the degree of marginalization of a 
municipality is highly correlated with lack of access financial services Yaron, J. (1994)
 11
. 
 
En las tres ecuaciones los resultados econométricos reportan que el capital social fue 
significativo en los préstamos, ahorros y las recuperaciones. En los tres casos el signo es 
positivo. No se observa un patrón de comportamiento en las variables control, con excepción 
del indicador: porcentaje de población ocupada con ingreso menor de 2 salarios mínimos, que 
fue estadísticamente significativo en las tres ecuaciones. Es decir, cuando las personas ganan 
menos de dos salarios mínimos perciben menos préstamos, ahorran menos y también 
recuperan menos. Aislando los componentes y estimando las tres ecuaciones pero ahora sólo 
con el índice de marginación integrado se tiene lo siguiente:      
 
                                                          
10
 F-estadistic is 5.60, 2.50 and 25.01, respectivaly and it probability is 0.0000 in the three cases. 
11
 In 2000, only 13% of municipalities with high and very high marginalization in Mexico had some kind of 
financial intermediation in the region. Source: The portal of microfinance in Mexico 
http://www.microfinanzas.net 
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In the three equations econometric results reported that social capital was significant in loans, 
savings and recoveries. In all three cases the sign is positive. It was not observed a behavior 
pattern in the control variables, with the exception of the indicator: Percentage of population 
with income less than 2 minimum wages, which was statistically significant in all three 
equations, i.e. when people earn less than two minimum wages they save less and less 
recovery. Isolating the components and estimating the three equations but only with the 
marginalization index integrated the results are as follows: 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables  
LnLoans LnSavings LnRecoveries 
Ln
1
Loan Funds 
0.7255*** 
(0.1668) 
  
LnEquity 
 0.7012** 
(0.6887) 
 
Average Loans 
  505.9847*** 
(31.1905) 
Average Loans
2
 
  -0.0273*** 
(0.0019) 
LnSocialKT 
0.2302*** 
(0.1296) 
0.5557*** 
(0.4434) 
596.4765
3
*** 
(95.0629) 
Constant 
-5.0011** 
(1.9213) 
- 5.6483** 
(4.4871) 
-454341.7** 
(57084.64) 
Margination Index 
0.1736** 
(0.0965) 
-0.2958** 
( 0.1499) 
60.493*** 
( 20844.21) 
n 54 42 42 
R
2
   0.4971 0.5014 0.8878 
R
2
 adjusted  0.4669 0.4011 0.8757 
1
Ln=natural logaritm; 
3
there are not included logaritms only in this term because the functional form of the 
recoveries equation. The terms in parentheses refer to the values of the standard errors. Significance levels are 
***(99%), **(95%) y *(90%). The variables were significative in the joined form. 12 
 
Again, in the three equations social capital was significative with positive sign. It was 
observed that when the equations were estimated with the marginalization integrated index it 
has an effect on the loans, savings and recoveries. That is, when the members of the solidarity 
funds are located in marginalized municipalities in the percentage of loans is higher but the 
percentage of savings is lower (perhaps because the income effect), although the amount of 
recoveries is greater. 
 
In the first equation it is observed that 49.71% of the variation in loans is explained by the 
variation in the loanable funds and social capital. It can be inferred that the services provided 
by the solidarity funds via loans depend positively on the amount of resources available to 
loan compounds of the equity and savings, and social capital. It also follows that greater 
resources available to the Fund, the greater the number of loans to be granted, so too does 
social capital, the greater social capital is the more loans will be allocated. It was also 
demonstrated that there are constant returns to scale
13
, which means that if the amount of each 
factor doubles (equity+savings and social capital) also doubles the number of loans that are 
granted, ceteris paribus. Substituting the values of the estimated coefficients in the production 
function it is as follows: 
 
                                                          
12
 F-estatistic was 16.47, 13.39 and 73.19, respectively, and the probabilidad was 0.0000 in the three cases. 
13
 Wald test (F-estatistic was 0.8013 and probability was 0.4012). 
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Loans= 0.006 Loan Funds
0.7255 
SocialKT
0.2302
 
 
The value of the constant means that if the loanable funds and social capital are equal to one 
the loans value is 0.006%
14
, ceteris paribus, ie, when the amounts of equity and savings are 
small and the sympathy between members is very low the amount of loans that is grated is 
minimal and zero when they are close or equal to unity. 
 
The loanable funds and social capital coefficients are the product elasticities of the loans. 
Thus, an increase of 1% loanable funds generate an increase of 0.7255% in loans given, 
ceteris paribus. In the same way if the social capital rises by 1% the product (measured by the 
loans) increases by 0.2302%, ceteris paribus. Although social capital has a significant impact 
on the loans allocation that is lower than that of loanable funds, ie the provision of funds 
affects more than the existence of the total social capital to give more loans. After estimating 
the second equation the values of the coefficients are obtained and they are replaced in the 
production function as follows: 
 
Savings= 0.003 Equity
0.7012 
SocialKT
0.5557
 
 
From these results it appears that changes in equity and social capital explain 50.14 percent in 
the variations in the number of collected savings. It can be inferred that the services provided 
by the solidarity funds via savings depend positively on the amount of resources for financing 
and depend also on social capital. In this regard, most available resources, by expanding the 
equity, generates greater savings collection, in the same way, the more social capital leads to 
greater confidence in the resource deposit in the solidarity funds. There were also constant 
returns to scale
15
, which means that if the amount of equity and social capital doubles, the 
number of savings that are captured doubles too. 
 
It also follows that the value of savings is 0.00316 if the equity ans social capital are equal to 
one, in other words, when the amount of resources to finance is small and sympathy that 
exists between members is very low, the amount of savings that is captured is minimal, or 
zero if they are close or equal to unity, ceteris paribus. The equity and social capital 
coefficients represent the elasticities product of the savings. Thus, an increase of 0.7012% in 
the savings is produced by a 1% increase in wealth, ceteris paribus. In the same way, the 
product (measured by the number of savings) rises at 0.5557% if the social capital increases 
by 1%, ceteris paribus. Again, social capital has a significant effect in attracting savings, but it 
is less than the equity, ie, the provision of resources affects more to finance than existence of 
social capital to attract more savings. 
 
In the same way, using the sample with 54 observations they were estimated coefficients of 
the third equation. The 88.78% of the variation in recoveries was explained by the variation in 
average loans, square average loans and the social capital. It can be inferred that the 
performance of the funds (measured by recovery) depends positively on the amount of loans 
allocated by the producer, negatively on the square average loans and positively and 
positively on the existing social capital. Substituting the values of the estimated coefficients in 
equation three is as follows: 
                                                          
14
 exp
-5.0011
=0.006 
15
 Wald test (F-estatistic was  0.9889 and probability was 0.1758). 
16
 exp
-5.6483
=0.003 
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RECOVERIES= – 454341.7+505.98AVERLOANS – 0.0273AVERLOANS
2
 +596.47SOCIALKT 
  
From the estimations it is inferred that if total social capital increases by one unit the amount 
of recoveries is increased by 596.47 pesos, ceteris paribus. The interpretation of the above 
implies that for every additional producer that owns and activates their social capital with his 
partners it will be generated increases in recoveries of loans by an amount of 596.47 pesos. In 
this sense, a greater investment in social capital will recover a greater amount of borrowed 
funds. In the same way if the average loans in each Fund increase in one unit the amount of 
recoveries will increase by 505.98 pesos, ceteris paribus. If the square average loan in each 
fund increases in one unit the amount of recoveries is reduced by 0.0273 pesos, ceteris 
paribus. In this way a larger amount of average loans by Fund generate recoveries of the 
resources but after reaching a certain value they begin to decline with increased average loans. 
In marginal terms increases in recoveries due to the increase in average loans will be higher 
than the reductions before reaching the maximum value. The peak is reached at: 
 
      
  
03.267,9
0273.02
98.505
recoveriesmaximizesValue 

loansaveragetheofthethat  
 
The above result comes from the maximization of recoveries and implies that by increasing 
the solidarity funds loans per member by a unit the recoveries are increased by about 505.98 
pesos on average, but after that the loans exceeded the amount of 9267.03 pesos the 
recoveries start to decrease by around 0.0273 pesos per average loan additional. If the social 
capital and marginalization index had a value of zero at the inflection point recoveries would 
be of 1,890,168.53 pesos. Loans by a producer in the sample of 54 observations are of 
1,966.44 pesos on average and the amount of recoveries of 410,591.11 pesos on average, 
meaning that funds may still allocate loans per producer of 7,300.59 pesos on average before 
reach the peak and start to experience reductions in their recoveries. 
 
The constant has a special treatment in this equation. Since negative values of the constant 
have non sense from the recoveries, the constant would only get the value of average loans 
when the recoveries are not obtained, which could be reached in 951.75 pesos in the case of 
social capital and the marginalization index had a value of zero. 
 
It is important to note that although the amount of loans given to producers affected 
significantively the amount of recoveries the greatest effect is produced by the total social 
capital. Thus, it is expected that a greater investment in social capital allow greater recoveries 
of loans. 
 
From the results obtained of the estimation of the third equation it is inferred that the 
recoveries of the borrowed funds are dependent on average loans and the social capital. 
Furthermore, it shows that social capital positively affects the performance of the solidarity 
funds via recoveries and they have a different behavior with the increase in average loans. 
Therefore, it can concluded that social capital has a significant effect on productivity of the 
solidarity funds in the sense that it helps to attract more savings and to allocate more loans 
and it also affect the financial performance of the funds. 
 
9. Conclusions 
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Classical economic theory assumes that the relations of sympathy or antipathy between 
individuals do not substantially affect the outcome of transactions. This implies that the social 
distance between suppliers and purchasers is often very large and these relations do not affect 
prices and quantities that are assigned or taken on the market. However, evidence suggests 
that relationships matter. They can alter and modify terms of market performance. Social 
capital refers to networks, norms and trust that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit. 
 
Given that social capital makes it possible to achieve certain resources that could not be 
achieved in its absence or could do so only at high cost, this allows for poor producers have 
access to financing and helps microfinance schemes reach their financial sustainability. In 
Microfinance, social capital works by solidarity bonds, neighborhood and community 
organization, operates under the mechanisms of peer pressure and peer monitoring which 
allows them to minimize costs of monitoring and credit analysis. The problem of adverse 
selection is minimized because members select their peers to participate in these schemes. Its 
members use the social collateral for obtaining loans and as security for loan repayment, its 
principal asset is the trust that exists between them. 
 
Social capital in the solidarity funds is expressed by the participation, trust and responsibility 
of the members. They take the voluntary decision to constitute the funds with the loan 
recoveries given by government programs. They decide who can be the new member based on 
information they have on the reliability and ability to pay of the members of their 
communities. They are owners of these mechanisms and responsible for the recovery of 
resources at the same time, they are also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the 
solidarity funds. Their participation in the creation, discussion of operation rules and 
monitoring has contributed to the organization and evolution of the solidarity funds. By the 
peer pressure ad peer monitoring scheme they have reduced the problems of fraud or default, 
which has helped to reduce the risk of bankruptcy and prevent its spread to other regional 
economic sectors. 
 
In order to prove that social capital is productive in the solidarity funds the social capital 
effects were analyzed (associated with the members) in the loans allocation, collection of 
savings and the recovery of loans. To this objective it was explored the following hypotheses: 
a) The social capital can be estimated through an index of inequality by using extrapolation 
method; b) The social capital affects the productivity of the solidarity funds, and c) social 
capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity funds. 
 
From the results obtained in testing the first hypothesis by the extrapolation method it was 
inferred the inverse relationship between social capital and inequality in two ways with five 
indices of inequality and trust indicators of social capital. The results show that the best proxy 
for estimating the social capital is the coefficient of variation. To verify this relationship the 
social capital was estimated at country level and states level under the two methods. The 
results showed a similar trend in their behavior and an inverse relationship between the 
variables of social capital and inequality. Thus, the years in which the highest inequality was 
presented are also the years with lowest investment in capital capital. In the same way, the 
states that showed the highest rates of inequality are also those who had the lowest 
percentages of social capital. 
 
To test the second hypothesis they were estimated the services offered by the solidarity funds 
(number of loans and savings) through two productivity equations represented by production 
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functions Cobb Douglas type. The inputs considered were loanable funds, equity and social 
capital. From these results it was deduced that the services provided by the funds via loans 
depend positively on the amount of resources available to offer loans and the existing social 
capital. It was also noted that greater resources available in the Fund, the greater the number 
of loans to be granted and greater the social capital the greater loans to be allocated. In the 
same way it was observed that the number of savings transactions made depends positively on 
equity and social capital; it was noted that the greater provision of resources through the 
expansion of equity, generate greater savings and more social capital generate greater 
confidence to deposit resouces in the solidarity funds. 
 
To test the third hypothesis it was estimated a performance equation through recoveries. The 
results shows that the funds performance, as measured by recoveries, depends positively on 
the amount of loans allocated per member, depends negatively on square average loans and 
positively to the existing social capital. It was also noted that the higher average loan 
recoveries increase, but reach a point where a larger amount of loans loses the control of the 
recoveries and instead of increase recoveries they are reduced. 
 
Additionally it was found that a greater investment in social capital will recover a greater 
amount of borrowed funds. It was noted that although the amount of loans granted by 
producer affects the amount of recoveries, the greatest effect is produced by social capital. 
Thus, it is expected that a greater investment in social capital allows higher loan recoveries. 
 
It was analyzed the importance of social capital in the sense that the performance and 
productivity of a microfinance program can be expanded or limited by its social capital. 
However, these conclusions were deduced from a scheme with government participation, it is 
questionable whether public efforts in the allocation of credits can be successful without 
sufficient levels of social capital provided by the members. Therefore it is appropriate to 
examine the assumptions outlined in microfinance schemes without government involvement, 
such as FINCA, CAME, among others. 
 
The solidarity funds do not have the authorization from CNBV to operate as EACPs in terms 
of the LACP because they are civil societies. This status limits the development of these 
financial funds and prevents them from the backing of the banking authorities, this is not a 
serious obstacle to their development, but may be in the future. So, while for internal 
management, the funds have statutes and operation rules approved by the membership, it is 
necessary that they were supported and backed by the appropriate legislation. In this sense, 
social capital has a special advantage on the legal aspect of the solidarity funds, its operation 
mechanisms, supervision and funds control gives them confidence and certainty to the 
members on the use and recovery of resources. Otherwise this could not be observed because 
the funds legal situation under can not be governed by other statutes and do imply a high cost 
for the funds or change its social denomination. 
 
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the relationships influence the products and the 
loans recoveries, and then the economic recommendations include actions to build, maintain 
and increase social capital. Investment in social capital can be achieved when individuals are 
involved in cooperative or synergistic activities in which those involved have an interest in 
the success of others, and therefore have more communication, share common causes and 
responsibilities, offer more favorable trade terms, create social bonds and interact for the 
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benefit of the community. The design of social programs that are based or encourage 
participation may boost this kind of synergistic activities. 
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